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Abstract 
In recent decades, ethnohistorians have successfully shifted historical 
discussions of North American colonialism from a tale of White "pioneering" to 
one focused on Indigenous Peoples \s experiences of, and responses to, imperial 
invasions. Too often, however, scholars have characterized the colonial impulse 
as a simple and singular phenomenon, one static across time and space. The case 
of the American invasion of the Ohio Country during the second half of the 
eighteenth century, however, demonstrates that the timing, nature, and pace of 
colonization depended upon two critical variables: perceptions and propaganda. 
Many Whites who entered Ohio as squatters, soldiers, speculators, or traders 
imported an irrational, nearly paranoid fear of the Ohio Indians, and Native 
Americans in general. At the same time, many Whites who ventured westward did 
so because they imagined the Ohio Country as an Eden that promised huge profits 
and easy living—a vision of paradise that informed the popular imagination through 
rumor, exaggeration, and advertisements. These twin impulses worked in synergy 
to fuel a superheated atmosphere of extreme covetousness and virulent Indian-
hating in the Revolutionary Old Northwest which undermined attempts at cross-
cultural compromise and drew Shawnee, Delaware, Ottawa, Wyandot, Miami, Mingo, 
and other Native Ohioans into a homeland war of attrition against not only White 
invaders, but also a particularly pernicious strain of colonialism. 
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On a June day in 1775 that began with a thick fog blanketing the Ohio River 
Valley, Nicholas Cresswell and his hastily assembled, ragtag crew of western 
adventurers suddenly thought their worst nightmares were about to come taie. On 
an extensive tour of eastern North America, Cresswell, a 25-year-old English traveler 
and diarist, had insisted on seeing the famed Ohio Country for himself even after 
receiving numerous warnings of an escalating cycle of violence and retaliation 
between Indians and White settlers along the Ohio and its tributaries. Cresswell 
probably had heard armors that the country west of Virginia and Pennsylvania 
was a wondrous Eden of striking beauty, rich soil, easily navigable waterways, and 
natural ports. Emboldened by an insatiable curiosity, the young Briton tried to 
ignore the frequent reports of shootings and scalpings along the river and set out 
from Pittsburgh toward the Mississippi—into the heart of Indian country—with 
the only itinerants he could find who were willing to float into danger with no real 
prospect of profit for their efforts. The expedition made it as far as Harwoodsburg, 
a young settlement in western Kentucky, where they heard fresh news of Indian 
attacks down the river. Terrified, the crew refused to humor Cresswell any further 
and insisted on turning around. News of renewed violence, Cresswell lamented, 
"has struck such a panic that I cannot get anyone to go down the Ohio with me on 
any account." He was ""much provoked" by his "'disappointment," and vowed t 4to 
return by the first opportunity."1 
Although the conflict that prevented Cresswell from reaching the Mississippi 
had ostensibly begun the previous year when a group of Virginian "Long Knives" 
murdered the family of Logan, a Mingo war chief, increasing violence along the 
Ohio was actually part of a long-smoldering and seemingly intractable war between 
westering White settlers and the Shawnee, Delaware, Miami, Mingo, Ottawa, 
Wyandot, and other Indigenous Peoples into whose territory they pressed. Some 
eager Virginians had already taken the signing of the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 
1768—by which the British government "purchased" lands south and east of the 
Ohio River from the Six Nations who had no real claim to the territory—as a signal 
that, in spite of the 1763 Proclamation Line designed to prevent colonists from 
crossing the Appalachians, the western country was essentially open for White 
settlement. The treaty's provision for a permanent boundary at the Ohio comforted 
the Indians little as they encountered increasing numbers of White invaders who 
simply ignored the authority of Great Britain, the colonies, the Indian nations, and 
treaties in general. To Native Ohioans, the Ohio River represented a permanent 
and inviolable boundary protecting their homes, crops, and hunting grounds from 
their expansive neighbors to the south and east. A growing number of frontier 
Whites, however, saw the waterway mainly as a highway offering easy access to 
what they perceived as available lands in a lush, if dangerous, wilderness. 2 
With the first White Kentucky settlements already established and tensions 
rising between the American colonies and mother Britain, by the summer of 1775 it 
seemed certain that the numbers of "Long Knives" crossing the river would only 
continue to increase. While constant rumors of murders and abductions spread 
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like wildfire among both Indians and Whites in the Ohio Valley, many among the 
region's Indigenous Peoples began to feel that the British government was 
indifferent to the fact that its subjects were violating the agreed-upon boundary, 
and that many of them simply murdered Indians who got in their way, often without 
being prosecuted or even questioned. Their families and villages threatened, some 
young Shawnee and Mingo men along the upper Ohio and Muskingum Rivers 
responded by raiding White settlements and taking captives. Indian-White 
relations in the Ohio Valley were particularly tense in the aftermath of the Battle of 
Point Pleasant of October 1774, during which Shawnee and allied warriors under 
Cornstalk attacked more than 1,000 assembled Virginia militiamen, but ultimately 
were forced to retreat. 3 
As they made their way up the Ohio toward Pittsburgh during the Spring of 
1775 after an abortive attempt to reach the Mississippi, Creswell and his party were 
keenly aware that their riverine highway bisected a battle zone. At Harwoodsburg, 
Cresswell quickly assembled a new crew to ascend the river and return to the 
relative safety of the East. He convinced whomever he could to accompany him to 
Pittsburgh. Often leaning toward intolerance and vanity, Cresswell was hardly 
thrilled to be sharing tight quarters with the diverse group of travelers that he 
managed to attract. This "motley, rascally, and ragged" crew consisted of "two 
Englishmen, two Irishmen, one Welshman, two Dutchmen, two Virginians, two 
Marylanders, one Swede, one African Negro, and a Mulatto." 4 Although Cresswell 
professed bravery and accused his companions of cowardice, his journal entries 
show that he felt great anxiety as the party set out against the current. On June 19 
he simply recorded, ' I n great fear of the Indians." 5 Five days later a crew member 
went missing and Cresswell quickly presumed that he had been scalped. The crew 
was preparing to depart when the man returned the next day, hungry, but with his 
scalp intact. He had been out hunting and had gotten lost in the woods. On June 
26 Cresswell repeated, "In fear of the Indians." An event two days later revealed 
the true depth of his—and his companions'—fears. 6 
This day, as they paddled up the Ohio, the men were at once startled when 
they saw, about 200 yards ahead, four canoes full of Indians. Then they suddenly 
noticed that there were six more canoes between them and the other bank so that 
they were "entirely surrounded." The crew wasted no time, "Everything was 
prepared for an engagement, all our lumber and a great part of our provisions were 
hoved overboard." 7 Already panicking, the men became frantic when they 
discovered that, of the 12 guns between them, five were waterlogged and unusable. 
"Mine happened to be in good order," Cresswell recalled, "and I loaded her with an 
ounce bullet and seven swan shot."* 
The men deferred command of their three canoes to Cresswell who quickly 
tried to formulate a strategy for either escaping or engaging the Indians. Almost 
immediately, however, the attempt at calm deliberation and organization degenerated 
into terrified chaos. Tom O'Brien, a traveler in the commander's canoe (who was 
Irish and Catholic, Cresswell made certain to mention), dropped his gun into the 
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river and, realizing it was now unfit for use, "laid down in the bottom of the Canoe, 
begun to tell his beads and prayed and howled in Irish." According to CresswelPs 
account, Boassier, the other Irishman on board, "followed O'Brien's example. 
Weeping, praying, said Ave Mary's in abundance, at the same time hugging a little 
wooden crucifix he pulled from his bosom most heartily." 9 
The three boats drew together and the men "held a short and confused 
council." 1 0 Cresswell decided that they should approach the cluster of six canoes 
in which they counted 23 Indians, attack, and then escape either by water or on 
foot into the woods. While the Indians sat watching the entourage's confused 
machinations from their boats along the shore, the terrified travelers noticed that 
these Native Ohioans appeared to be armed, each one holding a rifle. Meanwhile, 
the two Irishmen, "lay crying in the bottom of the Canoes and refused to stir."11 
Not one to miss an opportunity to applaud his own fortitude and humiliate his Irish 
companions, Cresswell described what happened next, "I set the muzzle of my Gun 
to O'Brien's head, threatening to blow his brains out if he did not immediately take 
his paddle. It had the desired effect, he begged for his life, invoked St. Patrick, took 
his paddle and howled most horribly. Dangerous and desperate as we imagined 
our situation to be, I could not forbear laughing to see the condition of the poor 
fellow." At the same time, Boassiers "pretended to be in a convulsion fit." Even 
after the others repeatedly splashed him with water, the man "refused to stir." 1 2 As 
CresswelPs fears mounted, he resolved to kill as many of the Indians as he could. 
He put another bullet on top of the ammunition he had already loaded into his gun. 
"I was determined to give some of them their quietus," he later recalled, "I confess 
I felt very uneasy." 1 3 
The tense and befuddled travelers slowly approached the Indians' canoes, 
ready to strike and then flee for their lives. Luckily for all involved, the leading 
canoe hailed the Native party before any shots were fired. CresswelPs men were 
greatly relieved to learn that, rather than hostile warriors, they had come upon a 
friendly hunting party of Delaware men and women led by the congenial Catfish. 
The rifles they had seen in each Indian's hands proved to be, in reality, paddles. 
"[0]ur fears," Cresswell astutely surmised, "had converted them into Guns." 1 4 
Catfish told the itinerants that they "had seen our confusion and laughed at 
us for our fears. 1 ' 1 5 After conversing for a while, the nervewracked Cresswell gave 
the Indians gifts of salt and tobacco "with which they seemed well pleased," and 
the party then continued on toward their destination, "very merry at the expense 
of our cowardly companions." 1 6 Meanwhile, Cresswell sniped, "Boassiers brags 
what he would have done had his Gun been in order. O'Brien says he was not fit for 
Death. All of them make some excuse or other to hide their cowardice." 1 7 Although 
it is impossible to determine how much of CresswelPs account was exaggerated, it 
is clear that the young Englishman was hardly immune to the almost paranoid fear 
of Indians that afflicted many White travelers and settlers in the Revolutionary 
Ohio Country 
The reactions of Cresswell and his companions upon encountering the 
Delaware hunting party illustrate one of the key forces which shaped White attitudes 
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and actions toward the Ohio Indians. This force was fear. Between 1774 and 1795, 
most Whites who crossed the river into Ohio either as squatters, land speculators, 
travelers, traders, soldiers, or government officials exhibited in word and deed a 
common sense of profound fear of the region's Indigenous Peoples, as if they 
were evil spirits inhabiting a "howling wilderness." Of course, one would expect 
anyone living in a dangerous and volatile region to experience some degree anxiety 
and apprehension. A particularly potent and destaictive strain of fear gripped 
many of Ohio's early White inhabitants—a fear fueled by a prevailing ignorance of 
Native cultures, frequent cross-cultural misunderstandings, and various theories, 
stories, reports, rumors, and captivity narratives which combined to inform the 
collective White popular imagination throughout British North America and beyond 
on the supposed "nature" of Indians. 
Nicholas Cresswell's narrative demonstrates that this extreme form of fear 
translated most often into violence within the Ohio frontier zone, as elsewhere. 
(The men and women in Catfish's hunting party very nearly received a hail of 
bullets rather than a greeting.) Collective fear and rumors of violence in fact worked 
reciprocally, fueling a cycle of killing and retaliation. This led to myriad rumors and 
suppositions which augmented Whites' indiscriminate fear of all Indians and, 
eventually, facilitated new acts of violence. This dark synergy of fear and violence 
lay beneath the competition for land in the Ohio Valley, and ultimately undermined 
all attempts for peace between Whites and Native Ohioans until the Treaty of 
Greenville instituted Indian removal in 1795, 1 8 
While much of the violence and misunderstanding between Indians and Whites 
in the Revolutionary Ohio Country was caused by fear, there were of course 
mitigating forces that attracted Whites across the river before 1795, and enticed 
many to spend the rest of their lives there. Would-be settlers imagined picturesque 
lands and plots of rich soil, exotic wild vegetables and fruits, and abundant game. 
Speculators envisioned vast tracts of open lands simply waiting for Whites to 
purchase and cultivate, fertile river bottoms, easily navigable passages, and natural 
ports. After the American Revolution, many of the nation's founders looked west 
to Ohio and saw a possible way to pay off the new republic's debts through land 
sales. Just as most Whites entering Ohio carried with them an exaggerated and 
extreme fear of the Ohio Indians, many also held an equally exaggerated and 
extreme covetousness for Ohio lands based largely upon preconceived notions of 
its supposedly limitless natural bounty. As with fear, positive exaggerations of 
Ohio's potential value were fueled by rumor and based on seeds of truth. The Ohio 
Country indeed was a bountiful and profitable place to live, farm, hunt, and invest. 
Even after crossing the river to find that Ohio was not exactly Eden, many accounts 
written by early White settlers, travelers, and preachers reflect the uncritical 
exuberance that had lured them westward in the first place.1" 
The White squatters, soldiers,.travelers, speculators, traders, and government 
officials who in ever-increasing numbers streamed into the Ohio Country during 
the 1770s, 1780s, and early 1790s brought with them unrealistic and exaggerated 
fears as well as unrealistic and exaggerated expectations of profit and success. 
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These two impulses combined to undermine the potential for mutual understanding 
and cooperation between Indians and Whites, helped to perpetuate cycles of 
frontier violence, and fostered in White settlers a potent strain of what later would 
be called Manifest Destiny. Most believed that the Ohio Country could not be 
shared by Whites and Indians, that the presence of Indians would ultimately 
prevent White Ohioans from achieving true security and realizing their idealized 
visions of Ohio as an earthly paradise, and that Indian removal from Ohio and 
White dominance of the region was not only desirable, but inevitable. 
One need not delve far into the diaries, journals, manuscripts, and letters 
written by Whites who crossed the river into Ohio to find unfavorable views of the 
Ohio Indians, and Native Americans in general. As had been the case in earlier 
frontier zones to the east, Whites in charge of negotiating treaties with Indians in 
council often went into peace talks with the assumption that Indians in general 
were duplicitous, untrustworthy, and "naturally" violent and vengeful. On the eve 
of talks with Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and Sac 
representatives that would result in theTreaty of Fort Harmar of 1789, Major 
Ebenezer Denny, General Josiah Harmar's favored deputy, predicted that "One-
half [of the Indians] will come in, sign articles and receive presents, while the 
others are killing, scalping and doing every possible damage they can." 2 0 Harmar 
himself later commented to a subordinate, "The savages may make the greatest 
professions of friendship, and be deceitful at last; therefore, never be off your 
guard with them."2 1 Even more bluntly, the general explained to a friend that, in his 
view, "The savages . . . will continue their carnages and depredations until 
government raise a proper force to sweep them off the face of the earth." 2 2 Later 
that year Harmar was given the chance to do just that, commanding a force of 320 
regulars and 1,100 Kentucky militia against Miami, Shawnee, and Delaware towns 
on the Maumee River. His army burned the main Maumee settlements but was 
ultimately surprised in a trap designed by Miami war chief Little Turtle. Harmar *s 
army suffered more than 250 casualties, and he was forced to retreat. 2 3 
Other White visitors in the Ohio Country expressed shock and discomfort 
upon seeing Indians with painted faces, or upon witnessing ceremonial dances. 
When groups of Seneca, Delaware, and Wyandot arrived for treaty talks at Fort 
Mcintosh in 1785, they appeared to Ebenezer Denny "a very motley crew—an 
ugly set of devils all." 2 4 While visiting the Delaware town of Coshocton in 1775, 
Nicholas CresswelPs Indian lover persuaded him to participate in a dance. Even 
though Cresswell was dressed and painted, and "danced round with little order" 
along with his Delaware hosts, he was nevertheless taken aback and frightened by 
the experience. Once the fire was kindled, the dancers, he observed, began 
"whooping and hallooing in a most frightful manner." 2 5 
Regarding the dancing itself, Cresswell wrote, "This is the most violent exercise 
to the adepts in the art I ever saw. No regular figure, but violent distortion of 
features, writhing and twisting the body in the most uncouth and antic postures 
imaginable." 2 6 He observed that the men tied deer hoofs around their ankles for 
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percussion, and shook hollow gourds to the drum beat. The women rattled bells 
and thimbles. 'The jingling of these Bells and Thimbles," Cresswell found, "the 
rattling of the Deer's hoofs and gourds, beating of the drum and kettle, with the 
horrid yells of the Indians, render it the most unharmonious concert, that human 
idea can possibly conceive." 2 7 He was particularly stunned to see a "conjurer," 
who was "dressed in a Coat of Bearskin with a Visor mask made of wood, frightful 
enough to scare the Devil." 2 8 
Indeed, for some the sights and sounds of Ohio Indian dances seemed nothing 
short of Satanic. On a visit to Marietta shortly after its founding, New England 
merchant and Ohio Company representative Colonel John May met the Delaware 
chief Captain Pipe and several other Delaware who were dressed and painted in 
preparation for a dance that evening. To May, the Indians seemed to be "dressed 
and acting like the offspring of Satan." 2 9 That night, lodging in a cabin near the 
Delaware's camp, May complained that he "got little rest" because "The Indians 
made one of their hellish pow-wows, which lasted till the hour of rising." 3 0 
Beginning with the opinion that Indians were by nature untrustworthy, 
unreliable, greedy, violent, irrational, unreasonable, prone to drunkenness, or 
Satanic, many Whites—including those in charge of formulating and implementing 
official policy, fighting wars, and negotiating treaties—believed that meaningful 
cooperation and peaceful coexistence between themselves and Native Peoples 
was simply impossible. Increasingly throughout the Revolutionary period, White 
officials and frontier settlers alike expressed the sentiment that due to the Indians's 
problematic "nature," peace would not come to the Ohio frontier until its Indigenous 
Peoples were removed or exterminated. Even while negotiating treaties ostensibly 
designed to establish permanent boundaries between Indian country and the 
States, American officials often privately (and sometimes publicly) alluded to the 
impermanence of these measures, and to the inevitability of total White dominance 
of the region. With the certainty of religious faith, many Whites in the Ohio Country 
believed that the place would soon be entirely theirs, and viewed solemnly sworn 
treaties with the Ohio Indians as mere temporary expedients, signed with a wink 
and a nod. By the mid-1780s when the Ohio and Miami land companies received 
Congressional land grants to survey and sell tracts north and west of the river, the 
United States government, as well as many individual founders, were betting on 
this result.3 1 
When Lord Dunmore's War broke out in 1774 between Shawnee and Mingo 
and the Virginian "Long Knives," it was not yet clear that a war of attrition had 
begun that would last 20 years and result in an overwhelming flood of White faces 
into Indian country. But in a letter to the Shawnee designed to pressure them into 
discontinuing their retaliatory raids on White settlements, Pennsylvania Lieutenant 
Governor John Penn made a prescient prediction. "Brethren," he wrote, "it gives 
me great concern, and my Heart is grieved to hear of the difference between you 
and our Brothers, the People of Virginia. . . . It is a very wicked Thing to kill 
innocent People, because some of their countrymen have been wicked, and killed 
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some of y o u . . . . If you continue to act in this Manner the People of Virginia must 
do the same Thing by you, and then there will be nothing but War between you. 
Consider, Brethren, that the People of Virginia are like the Leaves upon the Trees, 
very numerous, and you are but few, and although you should kill ten of their 
People for one that they kill of yours, they will at last wear you out, and destroy 
you." 3 2 
Penn's letter was remarkable not only because the Lieutenant Governor 
ascertained so early that the sheer numbers of settlers would contribute decisively 
to the conflict's ultimate outcome, but also because he placed the responsibility of 
reinstating and maintaining peace squarely upon the Shawnee, ignoring the fact 
that encroaching Whites had sparked the war in the first place by squatting on 
Indian lands and by indiscriminately murdering Indians who had previously been 
friendly toward Whites. 
Even in distant Philadelphia, the new republic's first Secretary of War, Henry 
Knox, ascertained from reports filed by General Harmar and land speculator John 
Cleves Symmes that the conflict between the Ohio Indians and the frontier Virginians 
was intractable. In a report to Congress in 1787, Knox concluded that "the deep 
rooted prejudices and malignity of heart, and conduct, reciprocally entertained 
and practiced on all occasions by the Whites and Savages will ever prevent their 
being good neighbors." 3 3 Interestingly, Knox found the "Long Knives" at least 
partially culpable for sustaining the cycle of violence, but saw no possible solution 
except for "Government" to keep both sides "in awe by a strong hand," an unlikely 
scenario.3 4 Knox astutely recognized that in the competition for Ohio Valley lands, 
retaliatory murders and scalpings by Indians and Whites had fostered a culture of 
fear and loathing which made escalation only more likely. "The one side," he 
observed, "anxiously defend their lands which the other avariciously claim. With 
minds previously inflamed the slightest offence occasions death—revenge follows 
which knows no bounds. The flames of a merciless war are thus lighted up which 
involve the innocent and helpless with the guilty." 3 5 
Prominent military leaders in the Ohio Valley also felt that diplomacy and 
treaties would only delay the day that they believed inevitably would come, when 
American soldiers would ultimately dispossess the Ohio Indians and White farms, 
towns, and cities would transform the landscape. During the late 1780s, Generals 
Josiah Harmar and Arthur St. Clair (first Governor of the Northwest Territory), both 
ambitious men, each hoped to command the force that would finally "sweep [the 
Indians] off the face of the earth." 3 6 Harmar was particularly eager to march against 
the cluster of Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee towns on the upper Wabash, the 
military and diplomatic headquarters of the tenuous Ohio Indian confederacy. 
With biting sarcasm, he wrote in 1788, "I sincerely hope that the new government 
will shortly be adopted, and that the next treaty . . . may be held with the savages 
with fifteen hundred or two thousand troops." 3 7 Harmar held out no hope for 
diplomacy, as he was convinced that the Indians would continue to attack settlers, 
treaty or no treaty. Later in the year he warned, "The new government I hope will 
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soon operate, and expect in the course of the next year we shall not tamely suffer 
the subjects of the United States to be murdered by these perfidious savages. The 
savages are, in my opinion, hatching a great deal of mischief."3 8 Shortly before he 
was given marching orders in 1790, Harmar wrote tellingly to a friend, "The Indians 
are exceedingly troublesome. I know of nothing that will cure the disorder, but 
government raising an army to effectually chastise them—all treaties are in vain." 3 9 
St. Clair's recorded statements revealed that what officials told the Ohio Indians 
in council at times clearly contradicted what they communicated to policymakers 
in Philadelphia and settlers on the frontier, as well as what they privately believed. 
On July 13,1788, St. Clair addressed a multi-ethnic council of Ohio Indians from 
different villages. He expressed regret that more Indians did not appear for the 
negotiations, and disappointment that violence continued on the frontier despite 
the fact that a treaty had been signed at Fort Mcintosh three,years prior, an 
agreement that was—from Congress's point of view-—designed to curb ongoing 
raids on settlements. In his speech, St. Clair, in lyrical phrases imitative of Native 
orators, professed a true desire for peace with the Ohio peoples—a goal that was 
thwarted, he said, only because too many Indians refused to treat with the United 
States. "I had indeed hoped to accomplish a great and good work," he announced, 
"to have planted the Tree of Peace—to have brought all the Nations to have 
watered its Roots with us and sat together under its shade—to have removed all 
causes of complaint on both sides, and that having sprung from the same Earth to 
have infused the same spirit and have but one heart and one mind." 4 0 
A week before sitting in council and professing the goal of harmonious 
coexistence with the Ohio Indians, however, St. Clair expressed himself more 
candidly to Henry Knox. "The Western tribes," he wrote to the Secretary of War, 
"have been so successful in their depredations on the Ohio River—their settlements 
are so distant, and their country so difficult, they imagine themselves perfectly 
safe; and . . . by these incursions they gratify . . . their passions of avarice and 
revenge." 4 1 St. Clair offered that even "a hollow peace" with those few Indians 
likely to appear for talks would be. beneficial to the United States, as any such 
agreement would probably further divide the already shaky Native confederacy. 
This way, "The confusion that seems to prevail amongst the different tribes, might 
possibly be improved into a rupture." 4 2 After all, St. Clair concluded, there existed 
little chance of a real or lasting peace when Whites had the collective means, and 
the will, to dispossess the Indians: "Our settlements are extending themselves so 
fast on every quarter where they can be extended—Our pretentions (sic) to the 
country [the Ohio Indians] inhabit has been made known to them in so unequivocal 
a manner, and the consequences are so certain and so dreadful to them, that there 
is little probability of there ever being any cordiality between us." 4 3 St. Clair's two 
statements, one to a group of Indians in council, and one to the Secretary of War, 
only a week apart, are more than simply inconsistent; they reveal that the Governor 
engaged in calculated duplicity in order to quiet and calm the Indians while the 
young United States gathered strength to complete what White settlers and 
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speculators had already begun—the total removal or destruction of Ohio 's 
Indigenous Peoples. 
White settlers and speculators, however, were not drawn across the Ohio 
River simply out of the desire to kill or dispossess Indians. They had another 
powerful reason for crossing the river into the land owned and occupied by those 
whom they feared and loathed—the land itself. Ohio in the late eighteenth century 
was indeed a beautiful and bountiful place. The land offered vast forests of valuable 
timber, fields and bottoms with rich, fertile soils, a plethora of game, fish, fruits, and 
edible plants, and many wide waterways easily navigable by barge. But, as many 
settlers and travelers discovered, the Ohio Country was also, at times, harsh and 
unforgiving. Violent severe storms, the likes of which were exceedingly rare along 
the East Coast, were (and still are) common in Ohio. Floods, hail, lightning, and 
tornadoes alarmed those unaccustomed to severe weather, and caused extensive 
damage to crops and buildings. Cold and snowy winters could also lead to the loss 
of livestock, difficult hunting and fishing conditions, and in some cases, general 
famines. In short, the Ohio Country offered attractive benefits for settlers willing 
to risk Indian attacks, and the potential of good returns for speculators and 
government leaders willing to invest personal and public capital, but it was no 
paradise. 
Upon first settling in or traveling through the Ohio Country, most saw what 
they expected to see after hearing exaggerated rumors of Ohio's supposedly magical 
bounty—rumors augmented by land company advertisements. They found Ohio 
to be beautiful and lush, as described. Those who stayed, however, soon realized 
that, just as in the existing 13 States, Ohio lands would prove rich and hospitable 
for some, stark or even deadly for others. By the 1780s, however, "Ohio Fever" had 
begun in earnest and Ohio's image in the popular imagination mattered more to 
would-be immigrants than its actual landscape. White Americans' greed for Ohio 
lands turned out to be stronger than their fear and loathing of Indians. In fact, the 
seemingly oppositional impulses of exaggerated fear and extreme covetousness 
actually worked in synergy and, by the 1780s, undergirded the prevailing attitude 
among Whites on the Ohio frontier—that White Americans must inherit this 
paradise, and that the fearsome and unpredictable Indians simply had to go. 
Most White travelers in the Ohio Country noticed two things first upon arrival, 
the rich soil and the dense and seemingly endless woods. One of the earliest 
White residents in Ohio observed that the area surrounding Pickawillany (near 
present-day Piqua) was "fine, rich level Land, well timbered with large Walnut, 
Ash, Sugar Trees, Cherry Trees," and that it was "well watered with a great Number 
of Little Streams or Rivulets, and full of beautiful natural Meadows, covered with 
wild Rye, blue Grass and Clover." Writing in 1751, this trader concluded that, "it 
wants Nothing but Cultivation to make it a most delightfull Country." 4 4 One explorer 
found the lands around the confluence of the Ohio and Great Miami Rivers to be "a 
little hilly but rich beyond conception." 4 5 
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A soldier on his way to war under General St. Clair stopped near the Muskingum 
to observe in his journal that, "We have seen nature dressed in all her pride. . . . 
The land is timbered with Sugar Maple, Oaks, Button-wood, Beach, Walnut and is 
veiy fertile."4 6 Approaching Foil Washington and the infant settlement of Cincinnati, 
the same soldier noted, "a better tract of land . . . I never saw—and the timber 
exceeds all 1 ever saw—White oaks from 4 to 6 feet through and from 50 to 70 or 80 
feet high without limbs and hold their bigness better than any 1 ever saw before." 4 7 
Timber was so plentiful, in fact, that woodsmen at times felled large trees just for 
the purpose of harvesting an animal hiding in its branches. An inveterate traveler 
found himself intoxicated by the view from the Ohio River one February evening in 
"the most beautiful place I ever saw in my life. . . . [The Ohio] runs nearly in a 
westerly direction, and the setting sun at the extreme end, reflecting itself in the 
smooth water, and beautifully tinging the distant trees, rendered it at once one of 
the most sublime views 1 ever was witness to. The river looked like a little sea of fire 
before us; and, by the rapidity and smoothness of its current, seemed to be silently 
hurrying us on towards it ." 4 8 Many others felt drawn into the Ohio Country by its 
beauty, still more by renown of its beauty. 
Travelers, soldiers, and early settlers also found abundant game, fish, and 
wild edibles—at least during the warmer seasons. Along the Ohio River near the 
future site of the French settlement, Gallipolis, a traveler observed that, "Here 
buffaloes, bears, turkeys, with all other kinds of wild game are extremely plenty. A 
good hunter, without much fatigue to himself, could here supply daily one hundred 
men with meat." 4 0 While stationed at Fort Jefferson (present-day Greenville), a 
soldier recorded that, "Dear & bear are so plenty here it is common for them to am 
through our camp [and] sometimes knock down tents, men, etc." 5 0 
Wild turkeys were particularly abundant. A traveler lodging at young Cincinnati 
found that settlers there relied "a great deal upon deer and turkeys." 5 1 An early 
Marietta resident recalled later in life that wild turkeys were so numerous in the fall 
of 1790 that farmers had to scramble to secure their corn before it was ripe, lest 
their crops be destroyed by the animals. During that season, he remembered, a 
man killed 40 turkeys in one day with a rifle.5 2 One day in 1785, a party of Shawnees 
taught Major Ebenezer Denny their method for killing many turkeys at once. The 
Indians quietly approached a flock of the birds until surrounded by them. Suddenly, 
they let out "howlings and frightful screeches," scaring the turkeys up into the 
trees, at which point the men began firing. "In this manner," Denny happily 
recorded, "we sported with two flocks, until we had as many as we could 
conveniently carry home." 5 3 
The rivers and streams of the Ohio Country also teemed with large and tasty 
fish. In a letter to a friend, General Josiah Harmar took a break from lobbying for 
war against the Indians to relate "the beauties of Fort M'Intosh." Specifically, he 
meant the great fishing at this outpost near the meeting of the Ohio and Beaver 
Rivers. "What think you of pike of 25 lbs.; perch of 15 to 20 lbs.; cat-fish of 40 lbs,; 
bass, pickerel, sturgeon, & c ? You would certainly enjoy yourself." 5 4 While 
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stationed at Fort Hamilton on the Miami River, Captain Daniel Bradley and others 
constructed a "fish dam" with a funnel and basket, and secured it in the river. The 
first night, in early September, they caught "about 800 weight of different kinds of 
fish," and on the second night they nearly doubled that quantity. Bradley reported 
that "We have more fish than the whole garrison can make use of."55 
The waterways of Ohio seemed to promise a ready and inexhaustible supply 
of food, and insurance against starvation—at least until the winter freeze. 
Supplementing their diets with wild and gardened fruits and vegetables, as well as 
delicacies previously unknown by Whites, such as maple sugar, many early Ohio 
settlers were blessed with enough to eat, and a diversity of menu choices. Having 
just feasted on a surprisingly sumptuous meal of gammon, parsley, "excellent 
bread," with such luxuries as mustard and vinegar, John May was delighted. "In a 
word," he concluded, "we live superbly." 5 6 
Despite the land's apparent abundance, however, in the Ohio Country, superb 
living could quickly give way to miserable and life-threatening conditions. 
Easterners and Europeans could not have anticipated the violence and sudden 
onset of spring and summer storms in the Old Northwest. During June 1775, an 
English traveler witnessed what he believed to be "The loudest Thunder and 
heaviest rain I ever saw." 5 7 Another British itinerant described an April storm 
which produced "the most dreadful explosions, and the most vivid flashes I ever 
experienced in my life." The storm was a kind "of which we can form no idea in the 
old country."5 8 
In May 1772, Moravian missionary David Zeisberger and his flock of Christian 
Delawares witnessed a violent hailstorm. The wind was so destructive that 
everyone in the settlement had to abandon their huts in fear of falling trees. 
Watching from a clearing, they saw "the storm lay low the trees, like someone 
cutting so much grass." 5 9 
In a matter of minutes, the violent weather demolished much of the mission's 
corn crop. Almost exactly two years later, Zeisberger and the residents of 
Schoenbrunn suffered another "tremendous s to rm. . . which resembled a hurricane 
and damaged many houses and uprooted trees." He reported that "The air was full 
of fire."60 Ohio storms could also produce flash floods, as Joseph Barker found out 
during his second year in Marietta. The water reached a height of six feet in his 
house after an April downpour in 1790. 6 1 
Western storms were certainly bad, but no natural phenomenon was as horrible 
to Ohio settlers as a famine. During the spring of 1790, Luke Foster and 200 other 
residents of Columbia, an Ohio River settlement later absorbed by Cincinnati, 
nearly starved to death. Terrified of the possibility oflndian ambushes, the hunters 
of Columbia refused to leave the protection of the town in search of wild meat. 
Meanwhile, the town's supply of corn, flour, and milk diminished to nearly nothing. 
Foster estimated that there was, at its worst, less than one pound of pork to be had 
in the entire village. Many people fled the dwindling settlement, and those who 
stayed subsisted on beargrass until hunting could resume. 6 2 
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Some newcomers to the Ohio Country also found that the winter season 
posed special dangers. Held captive and adopted by a Delaware family, James 
Smith became separated from a hunting party during the winter of 1757-1758, and 
nearly starved. With the land coated in a thick, icy layer of snow, Smith found it 
exceedingly difficult to get close to any game without the crunch made by his 
footsteps scaring it off.63 Decades later, Francis Baily and his crew also experienced 
winter's wrath when they were shipwrecked and nearly killed on the Ohio River. 
The river had recently frozen, trapping their vessel, and then one day it began to 
thaw. A huge chunk of ice broke free and rammed into the side of the travelers' 
boat, smashing it to pieces, but miraculously sparing their lives. The men suffered 
only frostbite, but spent the rest of the winter marooned on the riverbank.6 4 
For every Ohio settler or investor whose enthusiasm was derived from seeing 
the country in person, many more were influenced by second-hand accounts. In 
1787, Manasseh Cutler, Director of the Ohio Company, drafted what became one of 
the most widely read tracts describing the Ohio Country. It was published in 
French and English and circulated throughout the United States and Europe. In 
addition to announcing the fiction that treaties with the Indians had rendered Ohio 
"Ready for Settlement," Cutler exaggerated wildly and invented freely. The tract 
advertised, for example, that "Both the high and low lands produce vast quantities 
of natural grapes of various kinds, of which the settlers universally make a 
sufficiency for their own consumption of rich red wine. It is asserted . . . that age 
will render this wine preferable to most of the European wines." 6 5 With even more 
blatant fabrication, the Ohio Company publication claimed that, "Cotton is the 
natural production of this country, and grows in great perfection."6 6 
Blessed with a perfect climate, Ohio lands would support nearly any crop 
imaginable, Cutler predicted, "And it is probable that not many years will elapse, 
before the whole country above Miami will be brought to that degree of cultivation, 
which will exhibit all its latent beauties, and justify those descriptions of travelers 
which have so often made it the garden of the world, the seat of wealth, and the 
centre of a great empire." 6 7 
As if his own feats of persuasion were insufficient, Cutler went on to quote St. 
John de Crevecoeur, French consul to the United States, who gushed, "I consider 
. . . the settlement of the country watered by this great river [the Ohio] as one of the 
greatest enterprises ever presented to man." For poor farmers in search of 
opportunity, Crevecoeur had some advice, "If a poor man, who had nothing but 
his hands, should ask me, 'Where shall I go to establish myself in order to live with 
the most ease, without the help of horses or oxen?' I would say to him, 'Go to the 
banks of one of the creeks in the Scioto bottoms; all that you will have to do will be 
first to obtain permission from the Indians from the neighboring village (this 
permission is no longer necessary since the treaty with them); second, scratch the 
surface of the earth and deposit there your wheat, your com, your potatoes, your 
beans, your cabbage, your tobacco, etc., and leave the rest to nature. In the 
meantime amuse yourself with fishing and the chase." 6 8 
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As early as 1789, the Ohio Country was being marketed on both sides of the 
Atlantic as not only a terrific "poor man's country," but as the new nation's future 
hub of agriculture, commerce, and "civilization." Cutler envisioned Ohio as a 
cultural and political Utopia where well-educated citizens would establish a peaceful 
and homogenous society free of oppressive European institutions, as well as the 
rowdy, discontented "rabble" which, some felt, plagued older American cities. In 
the Ohio Country, he forecasted, "there will be one advantage which no other part 
of the earth can boast, and which probably will never again occur—that, in order 
to begin right, there will be no wrong habits to combat, and no inveterate systems 
to overturn—there is no rubbish to remove, before you can lay the foundation." 6 9 
Just as Crevecoeur's prose was designed to tempt poor Americans westward with 
the impossible dream of a life of ease and abundance, Cutler's pitch was intended 
to lure wealthy eastern investors across the river with the promise of a brand new, 
rich, clean, safe, and enlightened world designed by and for like-minded (White) 
people. Not surprisingly, Ohio's first non-Indian towns and cities were settled 
predominantly by well-to-do New England families who expected to find—or 
create—settlements that conformed to these Utopian ideals. 
Manasseh Cutler and the investors who formed the second Ohio Company 
were by no means the first, or the only, speculators to bet on the future value of 
lands across the river, and on the government's ability to secure ownership of 
Ohio either by treaty or through force. Beginning in 1748, when wealthy Virginians 
formed the first Ohio Company, White colonists, and later, Americans of all social 
strata risked their lives and life savings' in the hope that Cutler's vision someday 
would be realized. However, increasingly during and immediately after the American 
Revolution, the backcountry farmers who were rapidly remaking the Ohio Valley 
piece by piece, and the moneyed and political interests who were formulating 
grand plans for the division, resale, development, and governance of the entire 
region viewed one another with suspicion. Both had legitimate reasons to worry. 
Squatters presented a threat to Ohio investors as well as to the federal 
government simply by claiming the ground they stood on. The act of squatting on 
lands beyond the Ohio River simultaneously challenged the power of eastern 
capital in the west, and the legal authority of the federal government. The mere 
presence of White squatters in the Ohio Country also provoked wars with the 
Indians that threatened to drain the new government's budget and thwarted 
attempts to survey the country, a necessary step before individual tracts could be 
sold. Moreover, the "Long Knives" were notorious Indian-haters who were likely 
to continue to indiscriminately murder friendly as well as hostile Indians. Worst of 
all, founders of the new republic worried that White settlers in Ohio might easily be 
convinced—or coerced—to ally with another imperial power, and that a British, 
French, or Spanish Ohio would not only cut off American interests further west, 
but could threaten the existing States. Squatters, meanwhile, worried with good 
reason that once the government and speculating companies began surveying 
and selling tracts in the Ohio Country, they would be kicked off "their" lands, and 
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their investment of hard work clearing fields and planting crops in a dangerous 
territory would, in the end, simply benefit rich eastern investors with government 
connections. The growing mutual suspicion between investors in, and squatters 
on, Ohio Indian lands added another dimension to the protracted competition for 
control of the Ohio Country. This competition was grounded in the same twin 
impulses that attracted Whites across the Ohio River in the first place—boundless 
covetousness and a sense of fear and suspicion bordering on paranoia. 7 0 
Even before the American Revolution, British officials expressed concern 
about the general character of the White "backwoodsmen" who lived between the 
Allegheny Mountains and the Ohio River, and who seemed to be moving ever 
westward. After his expedition against Shawnee and Mingo villages in late 1774, 
Lord Dunmore began to worry more about frontier Whites than about the Ohio 
Indians. In his official report, Dunmore accurately assessed the general restlessness 
and mobility of these people. "I have learnt from experience," he wrote to Lord 
Dartmouth, Secretary of State to the American colonies, "that the established 
Authority of any government in America, and the policy of Government at home, 
are both insufficient to restrain the Americans; and that they do and will remove as 
their avidity and restlessness incite them." Dunmore continued, "They acquire no 
attachment to Place: But wandering about Seems engrafted in their Nature; and it 
is a weakness incident to it, that they Should for ever imagine the Lands further 
off, are still better than those upon which they are already Settled."71 
In addition to their seemingly incessant itinerancy, Dunmore also noticed in 
Ohio Valley settlers a distinct indifference and, in some, a blatant hostility to 
imperial authority, laws, and treaties. Dunmore observed that, generally, 
northwestern frontierspeople "do not conceive that Government has any right to 
forbid their taking possession of a Vast tract of Country, either uninhabited, or 
which Serves only as a Shelter to a few Scattered Tribes of Indians. Nor can they 
be easily brought to entertain any belief of the permanent obligation of Treaties 
made with those People, whom they consider, as but little removed from the brute 
Creation." 7 2 Dunmore, however, wrongly concluded from his observations that 
Whites in the Ohio Valley were likely to "incorporate with the Indians" because 
they, like the Native Ohioans, were "Hunters . . . and equally ungovernable." 7 3 
Others confirmed Dunmore's unfavorable impression of Ohio Valley settlers 
and squatters as generally defensive of their perceived "liberties"—especially 
when it came to the "right" of preemption—but recognized that westerners' attitudes 
were certain to increase and perpetuate conflicts with the Indians, and would not 
incubate cross-cultural alliances. After presiding over treaty talks at Pittsburgh 
between Delawares, Shawnees, and Virginians—negotiations intended to establish 
a lasting peace in the upper Ohio Valley—Lieutenant Governor Henry Hamilton 
came to the disturbing conclusion that "any Peace between those people [the 
Virginians] and any of the savage nations is liable to frequent interruptions from 
more causes than one." "The Virginians," Hamilton wrote in his official report, "are 
haughty[,] Violent and bloody, the savages have a high opinion of them as Warriors, 
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but are jealous of their encroachments, and very suspicious of their faith in treaties, 
the Virginians having furnished them with frequent cause." 7 4 They had captured 
Shawnee and Delaware chiefs and treated them brutally, Hamilton learned. The 
Virginians have also, he found, "plundered, burnt and murdered without mercy." 7 5 
The enmity between frontier Whites and Ohio Indians only increased during 
the 1780s and 1790s as fear and apprehension gave way to simple hate. An 
Englishman touring the upper Ohio Valley during the 1790s recognized that "the 
most violent prejudices exist on both sides, between the Indians and those white 
people who live on the frontiers.. . so much so, that I have heard them talk with the 
same unconcern of killing an Indian, as of killing a deer or a turkey; and with a 
savage exultation they would mimic him in his dying agonies." The traveler 
supposed that "it would be impossible to find a jury in the back parts of America, 
who would bring any one in guilty of murder, for causing the death of an Indian." 7 6 
Interestingly, even as colonial, and later, American leaders bemoaned the fact 
that squatters were aggressively claiming supposedly "open" lands under the 
pretext of preemption, many well-to-do easterners and government leaders were 
doing the same thing, only with more leverage—and more secrecy. In 1767, for 
example, George Washington began his long career as aristocrat-squatter in the 
Ohio Valley when he called in a favor from his friend and western resident, William 
Crawford. Washington asked Crawford to search out a tract of at least 1,500 acres 
of top-quality land somewhere in the upper Ohio Valley that could be secured 
quietly, as such a move blatantly violated the 1763 Proclamation Act prohibiting 
White settlement west of the Appalachians. The Virginia planter saw a clear 
opportunity to invest in Indian lands by simply taking them. He wrote to Crawford, 
"It will be easy for you to conceive that ordinary or even middling lands would 
never answer my purpose or expectation." "No," Washington insisted, "a tract to 
please me must be r i c h . . . and, if possible, level." 7 7 
He asked Crawford to find a way to "secure" such a tract "from the attempts 
of others," predicting that "nothing is more certain than that the lands can not 
remain long ungranted, when once it is known that rights are to be had . " 7 8 
Washington assured Crawford that "For your trouble and expense you may depend 
on being repaid." Crawford immediately set out to accomplish this favor for his 
wealthy and influential friend.7 9 
Washington perceived that the standoff between Indians and Whites on 
either side of the Ohio afforded a unique opportunity to sneak in and secure 
contested lands. The Ohio Indians, he noticed, put up enough resistance against 
westering Whites to prevent a flood of squatters and speculators from entering 
the region. This was a fleeting circumstance, he felt. The Indians inevitably would 
be dispossessed, and Whites would come to own the entire Ohio Country one 
way or another. Thus, he reasoned, "Any person . . . who neglects the present 
opportunity of hunting out good lands, and in some measure marking and 
distinguishing them for his own, in order to keep others from settling them, will 
never regain it." 8 0 
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Although he was able to justify to himself, and to. Crawford, maneuvering his 
wealth and power to essentially squat by proxy on Indian lands, Washington 
knew that, if publicly known, such land dealings would raise many eyebrows. "I 
recommend," he wrote, "that you keep this whole matter a secret, or trust it only to 
those in whom you can confide, and who can assist you in bringing it to bear by 
their discoveries of land." 8 1 He warned Crawford that publicity could cause a land 
rush, or worse, incite the wrath of British governors. "All this may be avoided," 
Washington suggested, "by a silent management, and the operation carried on by 
you under the guise of hunting game, which you may, 1 presume, effectually do, at 
the same time you are in pursuit of land." 8 2 Crawford succeeded in finding a 
suitable tract for Washington, and built several small cabins to proclaim its new 
"ownership." Ironically, however, Crawford struggled to keep the tract for his 
benefactor, as squatters less powerful but more mobile than Washington built 
their own cabins next to the ones Crawford had erected, and dared Crawford and 
anyone else to try and remove them.*3 
For their part the "Long Knives" who squatted on Ohio Valley lands felt that 
their claims were more justified than those of remote investors, simply because 
they were physically there making "improvements" on the land, a condition 
traditionally necessary to validate claims of preemption. In 1785, soldiers under 
Ensign John Armstrong marched from the Ohio River into lands lying today within 
Trumbull, Mahoning, and Columbiana Counties, evicting squatters and burning 
cabins as they went. They were surprised to encounter fierce resistance, as some 
squatters insisted that no government or army could interfere with their "natural" 
rights to preemption. At Mingo Bottom, near present-day Steuben ville, the regiment 
placed a man named Ross under arrest after he "declared" that Armstrong's orders 
"never came from Congress Neither did he care from whom they came, for he 
was determined to hold his possession." 8 4 
Irate, Ross told Armstrong that if his soldiers dared burn his house, "he 
would build six more in the course of a week." 8 5 The squatter sealed his fate when 
he "cast many reflections on the Honorable, the Congress, the Commissioners and 
the commanding officer."8 6 Armstrong "conceived him to be a dangerous man," 
and sent him to stand trial in Wheeling. The soldiers then evicted Ross's many 
tenants in the town, and ordered them to move "to the eastern side of the Ohio" 
and to destroy their dwellings within "a few days," or the army would accomplish 
the task for them. 8 7 
The United States government's seemingly harsh treatment of Ohio squatters 
during the late 1770s and 1780s reflected a mounting tension between westerners 
and the new republic's strategic and economic interests in the region. Many of the 
founders feared that after the Ohio Indians were subdued or removed, discontented 
western Whites would soon become pawns in an imperial competition for control 
of the Ohio Country. Upon concluding an extensive tour of his western properties, 
having attentively observed the attitudes of White frontier settlers, Washington 
astutely realized that rather than alienating White Ohioans, it was in the new 
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republic's interest to win their loyalty. This, he argued in 1784, could best be 
accomplished by opening trade routes to the western settlements and thereby 
offering a financial incentive for frontier Whites to remain friendly to the United 
States, and obedient under its laws. "The Western Settlers—from my own 
observation," Washington wrote, "stand as it were on a pivet—the touch of a 
feather would almost incline them any way." 8 8 Luckily for the United States, he 
noted, the Spanish had not yet tried to entice Whites in the Old Northwest to forge 
economic and political alliances down the Mississippi River to the south and 
west. 8 9 
Washington perceived that, with the Spanish on one side and the British on 
the other, it was crucial that the United States establish control of Ohio and the Old 
Northwest. He thought that "The Western Inhabitants would do their part towards 
accomplishing it,—weak as they now are, they would, I am persuaded meet us half 
way rather than be driven into the arms of, or be in any wise dependent upon, 
foreigners; the consequence of which would be, a separation, or a War."9 0 The way 
to avoid defections, Washington emphasized, was "easy, and dictated by our 
clearest interest.—It is to open a wide door, and make a smooth way for the 
Produce of that Country to pass to our Markets before the trade may get into 
another channel" 9 1 Washington correctly predicted that commercial ties would 
ultimately be the strongest bond binding the west to the east, and would ensure 
the loyalty of even the most distant settlements well into the nineteenth century.9 2 
Immigrant Ohioans soon realized that they would have to share the frontier 
region with a multitude of Whites unlike themselves. Poor and middling English 
and Scots-Irish frontier families from Virginia found themselves intermixed with 
wealthy New England merchants, French, German, and Dutch immigrants, Moravian 
missionaries, and itinerants from throughout the northern and mid-Atlantic states 
who continued the tradition of squatting with the hope of someday securing legal 
title to "their" properties. Although the Moravians, led by Revs. David Zeisberger 
and John Heckewelder, established the Ohio settlements of Schoenbrunn, 
Gnadenhutten, and Lichtenau during the early 1770s, these towns had to be 
abandoned during the Revolution. The missionaries and their flock of Christian 
Indians ultimately found refuge in Canada. 
The first permanent White settlement in Ohio, founded by New England Ohio 
Company investors in 1788, was Adelphia, situated at the confluence of the Ohio 
and Muskingum Rivers. Its name was soon changed to Marietta. Neighboring 
Belpre was established two years later and became, in effect, Ohio's first suburb. 
Joseph Barker and other Marietta residents who removed to Belpre left in order to 
escape the noise and bustle of the larger town but still relied on its markets and 
port to do their business. Losantville, established in 1788 on the Ohio and Great 
Miami Rivers, soon changed its name to Cincinnati and quickly found itself 
competing with Marietta for the distinction of having the busiest port in the Ohio 
Country west of Pittsburgh. Gallipolis was settled in 1790 by French immigrants 
who arrived to find that the deeds they had purchased from Colonel William Duer's 
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Scioto Company were worthless—Duer's grant request had not been approved by 
Congress. To make matters worse, the French settlers, most of whom were Parisian 
doctors, lawyers, and other professionals, farmed so poorly that the town nearly 
starved during its first two winters. Although most of the original "French 500" 
left, those who stayed eventually purchased the tract from its legal owners, the 
Ohio Company. Most White settlers in Ohio, however, fared better than the "French 
500," and remained loyal to the United States because settlers, speculators, and 
founders shared the twin goals of open commerce and Indian removal. 9 3 
By the time of the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794—the last battle in Ohio's 20-
year war—and the signing of the Treaty of Greenville one year later, the synergy of 
paranoid Indian-hating and utopian-mythologizing of the Ohio Country was 
beginning to break down. Whites who crossed the Ohio River eventually came to 
see that the place was like any other part of the United States—enormously 
profitable for some, disastrous for others, and somewhere in between for most. 
The old Indian-White dialectic also ceased to define conditions across the river as 
Native Ohioans began to move further west in order to preserve their lives and to 
keep their many distinct cultures intact. With the balance of power shifted in favor 
of Whites, largely due to simple attrition, settlers increasingly saw the Ohio Indians 
more as obstacles to land ownership and commerce than as terrifying 
representatives of Satan. White Ohioans still wanted the federal government to 
remove Indigenous peoples from the land, but for different reasons. For their part, 
those Indians who signed the Greenville Treaty and ceded the lands that make up 
most of present-day Ohio did so not because they were "conquered peoples," but 
because they were already preparing to move further west, where they hoped to 
find more peace and autonomy than the Ohio Country afforded. Whites who 
crossed the river throughout the Revolutionary period also sought a kind of freedom 
they could not achieve in the east. Unfortunately for all, however, the impulses of 
fear and avarice had come before the ideal of peace. 
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